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Introduction to the Special Issue on the
Patterns of Interplay between Public and
Private Food Regulation
Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga*
This Special Issue aims to develop a deeper understanding of the interplay between public
and private actors in the regulatory governance of food. It starts from the observation that
the traditional concept of law as command-and-control legislation and law enforcement by
national governmental bodies, including inspectorates and courts, is not adequate to cap-
ture today’s world of food governance. Nowadays, a broad range of public and private enti-
ties acting at national and international level seek to shape and influence the production,
trade and handling of food and the risks involved therein. Drawing on data from Europe and
the United States, the contributions to this Special Issue seek to unravel the intimate, yet
complex ties between public and private actors within governance arrangements regulating
food safety and sustainability. The articles are focused around the various phases of the pol-
icy cycle for food governance, thus addressing the interaction in stages of agenda-setting
and rule-making, adoption and implementation, monitoring and enforcement, and evalua-
tion and review. In descriptive terms, each contribution lays out the ‘who’ (actors), the ‘what’
(activity), the ‘why’ (rationale) and the ‘how’ (instruments) of food governance. In evaluative
terms, the papers discuss and explain the results and challenges of the design of the public-
private governance arrangements. Jointly, the contributions offer original and invaluable
empirical insights explaining the rise, design and challenges of mixed governance arrange-
ments in the food sector.
I. Setting the Scene: Transitions in Food
Governance
Food governance has changed dramatically over the
past two decades. Many scholars have observed that
the traditional concept of law as ‘command-and-con-
trol’ legislation and law enforcement by national gov-
ernmentalbodies, including inspectoratesandcourts,
does not adequately capture today’s reality of govern-
ing food (including food safety, security and sustain-
ability). Circumstances such as the globalization of
the food chain, the growing public concern about
food safety following major food crises (including
BSE in the early 1990s), the increased economic pow-
er of large supermarket chains and the general per-
ception of failing state regulation havemade up a fer-
tile ground for transitions in the governance of food.
These transitions occur both in the public and pri-
vate domain. In the public domain it has been noted
that various European countries have established
new regulatory agencies or reformed existing ones
to oversee (private) food control activities.1 At the
transnational level, the European Union (EU)
strengthened its food safety legislation, and estab-
lished the European Food Safety Authority and the
Food and Veterinary Office amongst others to im-
prove government responses to food crises and en-
hance coordination between national food safety au-
thorities to better control risks in transnational food
chains.Moreover, andasvarious contributions to this
Special Issue demonstrate, food legislation has
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1 Ellen Vos and Frank Wendler (eds), Food Safety Regulation in
Europe. A Comparative Institutional Analysis (Antwerp/Oxford:
Intersentia, 2006); Gabriele Abels and Alexander Kobusch, “Reg-
ulation of Food Safety in the EU: Explaining Organizational
Diversity among Member States”, in Tetty Havinga, Frans Van
Waarden, Donal Casey (eds), The Changing Landscape of Food
Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 39-56.
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moved from a rather prescriptive and legalistic ap-
proach to favour more responsive and risk-based ap-
proaches by encouraging forms of self- and co-regu-
lation.2
Also the private sector has responded to the chal-
lenges posed by ever-more global food supply chains
and today’s suspicious and responsive consumers.
First and foremost,wehavewitnessed the emergence
of retailer-driven food safety regulation and of glob-
al coalitions for setting food safety standards.3 Pri-
vate food safety standards and complementing third-
party certification have acquired a pivotal role in fa-
cilitating entry and exit in the global food supply
chain.4 Private safety standards are frequently com-
bined with standards aiming at governing externali-
ties in food production. As the contribution by Oost-
erveer highlights, private food standards also aim to
address externalities such as environmental degrada-
tion, the depletion of common pool resources like
fish and loss of biodiversity. Also other concerns are
addressed through private food standards, however,
including labour conditions for farmers, animal wel-
fare and other issues considered part of corporate so-
cial responsibility.5
In addition to these business-to-business, indus-
try-led standards, also private standards developed
by civil society (NGOs, consumers, religious organi-
sations and other public interest groups) have sur-
faced to play an important role in certain sectors.
Moral standards dealing with issues of fair trade6 or
religious prescriptions7 are leading examples here.
At times, industry andNGOs collaborate inmeta-reg-
ulatory bodies such as ISEAL to improve their meth-
odsof setting standards for food, certifying foodbusi-
nesses and impact analysis.8
Marsden et al have used the concept of a ‘hybrid
model’ of food governance to describe a new balance
between public and private actors in the regulation
and governance of food.9 While there certainly has
been a shift in the balance between public and pri-
vate food regulation, we contend that both forms of
regulation also increasingly interact in the gover-
nance of food related risks. For example, many pri-
vate, retail-driven standards have emerged in re-
sponse to changes in public food legislation,10 while
public legal frameworks now also appear to respond
to the importance private standards play in food sup-
ply chains.11Oldfield, Verbruggen andHavingamost
2 Robyn Fairman and Charlotte Yapp, “Enforced Self-Regulation,
Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Busi-
nesses: The Impact of Enforcement”, 27 Law and Policy (2005),
pp. 491-519; Marian Garcia Martinez, Andrew Fearne, Julia
Caswell and Spencer Henson, “Co-regulation as a Possible Model
for Food Safety Governance: Opportunities for Public-Private
Partnerships”, 32 Food Policy (2007), pp. 299-314; Marian Garcia
Martinez, Paul Verbruggen and Andrew Fearne “Risk-based
Approaches to Food Safety Regulation: What Role for Co-regula-
tion?” 16 Journal of Risk Research (2013), pp. 1101-1121.
3 Spencer Henson and John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private
Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-
Setting Processes”, Paper Prepared for FAO/WHO May 2009,
available on the internet at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/
i1132e/i1132e00.pdf (last accessed on 16 July 2015); Errol Mei-
dinger, “Private Import Safety Regulation”, in Cary Coglianese,
Adam M. Finkel, David Zaring (eds), Import Safety: Regulatory
Governance in the Global Economy (University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, 2009), pp. 233-253.
4 Linda Fulponi “Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System:
The Perspective of Major Food Retailers in OECD Countries”, 31
Food Policy (2006), pp. 1–13;Tetty Havinga, “Private Regulation
of Food Safety by Supermarkets”, 28 Law and Policy (2006),
pp. 515-533; Tetty Havinga, “Transitions in Food Governance in
Europe. From national towards EU and global regulation and from
public towards hybrid and private forms of governance”, Ni-
jmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series 2012/02, avail-
able on the internet at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189478 (last
accessed on 16 July 2015); Terry Marsden, Andrew Flynn and
Michelle Harrison, Consuming Interests: The Social Provision of
Foods (London: University College London Press, 2000); Terry
Marsden, Robert. Lee, Andrew Flynn and Samarthia Thankappan,
The New Regulation and Governance of Food. Beyond the Food
Crisis? (New York: Routledge, 2010).
5 Valerie Nelson and Anne Tallontire, “Battlefields of ideas: chang-
ing narratives and power dynamics in private standards in global
agricultural value chains” 31 Agric Hum Values (2014),
pp. 481–497; Michael J Maloni and Michael E. Brown, “Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in the Supply Chain: An Application in
the Food Industry”, 68 Journal of Business Ethics (2006),
pp. 35–52.
6 Laura Raynolds, “Fair Trade: Social Regulation in Global Food
Markets”, 28 Journal of Rural Studies (2012), pp. 276-287.
7 Shana Starobin and Erika S. Weinthal “The Search for Credible
Information in Social and Environmental Global Governance: The
Kosher Label”, 12 Business and Politics (2010), pp. 1-35; Frans
Van Waarden and Robin Van Dalen, “Halal and the Moral Con-
struction of Quality: How Religious Norms Turn a Mass Product
into a Singularity” in Jens Beckert and Christine Musselin (eds),
Constructing Quality: The Classification of Goods in Markets,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 197 et sqq; Timothy
D. Lytton, Kosher: Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food.
Private Regulation in the Age of Industrial Food, (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2013).
8 Allison Loconto and Eve Foullieux, “Politics of Private Regulation:
ISEAL and the Shaping of Transnational Sustainability Gover-
nance, 8 Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 166-185; Paul
Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga, “The Rise of Transnational Private
Meta-Regulators”, 10 Osgoode Hall Law School Working Paper
Series (2014) No. 71, available on the internet at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2512843 (last accessed 16 July 2015).
9 Marsden et al., New Regulation and Governance of Food, supra
note 4.
10 Fulponi, “Private Voluntary Standards”, supra note 4.
11 Tetty Havinga and Frans van Waarden, Veilig voedsel: Toezicht
toevertrouwen? Sectorschets toezicht in de voedselsector, Report
for the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy, (Den
Haag: WRR, 2013) available on the internet at http://www.wrr.nl/
fileadmin/nl/publicaties/PDF-webpublicaties/Web_70_Havinga
_DEF2010.pdf (last accessed on 16 July 2015)..
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vividly echo this trend in their respective contribu-
tions to this Special Issue. Public actors establish
mechanisms of coordination and control concerning
private food standards and certification schemes in
order to save public resources, enhance policy out-
comes or ensure transnational application of nation-
al (regional) public laws.12 In other instances, as Van
der Voort demonstrates in his article, co-regulatory
initiatives are introduced inwhich public andprivate
actors seek to collaborate through institutional
frameworks and programmes. While it must be
stressed that co-regulation and other forms of hybrid
governance arrangements remain the exception and
most of the food governance remains either public
or private in nature, these arrangements between
public and private actors gainmore andmore impor-
tance and thus invite detailed examination.
II. Interplay Along the Policy Cycle
The contributions in this Special Issue are focused
around the various phases of the policy cycle for food
governance, thus addressing the interaction in stages
of agenda-setting, rule-making, implementation,
monitoring and enforcement, and evaluation and re-
view. Several commentators have argued that a reg-
ulatory regime not only comprises legislation, rules
and standards.13 Also implementation, monitoring
and enforcement are constitutive to a regulatory
regime.14 However, this conceptualisation fails to
capture the intricacies regarding private and mixed
forms of regulation. In traditional public (govern-
mental) regulation, implementation logically follows
rulemaking, as there is a legal obligation for the reg-
ulated entities to apply and carry out the rules. In the
case of private regulation such automatic application
or obligation to comply with the set rules is not a giv-
en. After drafting and promulgating the rules, these
rules at times first need to be adopted by the regulat-
ed to bind them. Adopting a private regulatory stan-
dard is deciding to accept those rules and to commit
to compliance. A private entity may decide to adopt
a private regulation for several reasons: because it is
legally mandatory, because compliance is made
mandatory by a dominant actor in the market (such
as a food retailer) or because the entity considers
adoptionbeneficial to enternewmarkets, for improv-
ing its reputation, for getting a better price or some
other reason.
Building on Henson and Humphrey’s classifica-
tion of the policy cycle for food regulation and earli-
er work by Havinga on regulatory arrangements in
food,15wedistinguish fourmain functions that seem
to apply to every regulatory arrangement. For a reg-
ulatory arrangement to be effective, rules have to be
laiddownandsubsequently adoptedand implement-
ed, and compliance with the rules has to be moni-
tored and enforced. Procedures of evaluation and re-
view complete the policy cycle and enable the evolve-
ment of the rules andorganisational learning.All reg-
ulatory activities can be thought of as part of one of
these functions:
(a) Agenda setting and rule-making;
(b) adoption and implementation;
(c) monitoring compliance and enforcement and;
(d) evaluation and review.
Most literature on private and hybrid governance is
focussed on the stage of agenda-setting and rulemak-
ing, and the distribution of tasks between public and
private actors therein. We expressly want to include
the other phases of the policy cycle. As Van der Hei-
jden already pointed out, the distribution of tasks
and responsibilities between the participants in a hy-
brid form of governance may vary along the other
phases of the policy cycle as well.16 Thus, interplay
12 See also: Paul Verbruggen, “Gorillas in the Closet? Public and
Private Actors in the Enforcement of Transnational Private Regula-
tion, 7 Regulation & Governance (2013), pp. 512-532; Paul
Verbruggen, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: A Com-
parative Analysis of Advertising and Food Safety, (Cheltenham,
Edward Elgar, 2014).
13 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin (2001),
The Government of Risk. Understanding risk regulation regimes,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), at p. 26-27; Kenneth W.
Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “The Governance Triangle: Regulato-
ry standards institutions in the shadow of the state”, in Walter
Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation,
(Princeton, NJ [etc.]: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 44-88,
at p. 63.
14 Colin Scott, “Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-regula-
tion”, 60 Administration (2012), pp. 61–89.
15 Spencer Henson and John Humphrey, “Codex Alimentarius and
private standards”, in Bernd Van der Meulen (ed.), Private Food
Law. Governing food chains through contract law, self-regulation,
private standards, audits and certification schemes, (Wageningen:
Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2011), pp. 149-174, at
p. 155-156; Tetty Havinga, “Conceptualizing regulatory arrange-
ments: Complex networks and regulatory roles”, in Havinga,
Changing landscape of food governance, supra note 1, pp. 19-36.
16 Jeroen Van der Heijden, “Friends, Enemies or Strangers? On
Relationships between Public and Private Sector Service Providers
in Hybrid Forms of Governance”, 33 Law & Policy (2011),
pp. 367-390.
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between public and private actors occurswithin each
function (e.g. a governmental organization and an in-
dustry association develop rules together or cooper-
ate in monitoring compliance with the rules) and be-
tween two or more functions (e.g. the government
sets the standards and a private organization moni-
tors compliance).
III. What Follows in this Special Issue
Each article in this Special Issue represents a specif-
ic case study into the ways in which public and pri-
vate actors interact, intended or unintended, in gov-
erning food related risks. The contributions seek to
unravel the intimate, yet complex ties between pub-
lic and private actors within mixed governance
arrangements regulating food throughout the full
policy cycle. They seek to discuss the interaction be-
tween public and private (both industry and civil so-
ciety) that occurs in today’s food governance by dis-
cussing arrangements in Europe, the United States
and global supply chains. In descriptive terms, each
paper lays out the ‘who’ (actors), the ‘what’ (activity),
the ‘why’ (rationale) and the ‘how’ (instruments) of
the particular arrangement of food governance. In
evaluative terms, the papers discuss and explain the
results, risks and benefits of designing public-private
governance arrangements. Jointly, the contributions
offer invaluable empirical insights explaining the
rise, design and challenges of mixed governance
arrangements in the food sector.
In the first article Michaela Oldfield discusses the
adoption of the United States’ Food Safety Modern-
ization Act, which devises a federal food law regime
in which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
comes to rely on private systems of standards and
third party audits for imported food. Oldfield con-
tents that US food law consists of multiple overlap-
ping networks of public and private actors who de-
velop food safety regulations within multiple types
of institutional venues, including private standards
regimes, courts, congresses, and government regula-
tory agencies. She explains how various interactions
within and across these networks shape and are
shaped by stakeholders’ interests and power rela-
tions, leading ultimately to the adoption of the FS-
MA in the form it took. The paper offers invaluable
insights intowhat consequences this plurality of pol-
icy venues may have on the roles and capacities of
affected stakeholders to influence governance
processes and outcomes.
The contribution by Haiko van der Voort shows
just how difficult it can be in practice to make a co-
regulatory arrangement work. In fact, his case study
of the co-regulatory regime for the quality control of
eggs in theNetherlands constitutes an example of co-
regulatory failure. Focusing on the adoption and im-
plementation of the arrangement, Van der Voort dis-
cusses in detail the interests, concerns and dynamics
that led to the design and indeed downfall of the
regime. As he argues, however, the evaluation ofwhy
this happened depends on the theoretical lens ap-
plied. From a “government” perspective (implying a
strong degree of hierarchy between the public and
private actors concerned) potential risks to public
health and safety should be erased, thus requiring a
strict private inspection protocol to mirror public
food inspections, including unannounced inspec-
tions and penalty fines. A “governance” perspective,
by contrast, emphasises a more horizontal, net-
worked relationship between the actors, stimulating
discussion, evaluation and learning. A review of the
arrangement could not overcome the stalemate that
had grown between government and industry re-
garding the criteria and conditions to make the
arrangement work. In the end, the inherently con-
flicting interests of the actors involved led to the
demise of the co-regulatory arrangement.
The failure of co-regulation in the Dutch egg sec-
tor proved a valuable lesson in designing new gover-
nance arrangements regulating food in the Nether-
lands involving both public and private actors. As
Verbruggen andHavinga highlight in their contribu-
tion, the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product
Safety Authority (de Nederlandse Voedsel- en Ware-
nautoriteit – NVWA) was careful to impose too rigid
a policy framework on industry actors (trade associ-
ations, certification bodies and verification bureaus)
when engagingwith them tooptimise its official risk-
basedmonitoringandenforcement strategy.Thecase
studies presented in the contribution focus on the
ways in which the NVWA has sought to control the
private control systems it enrols in its enforcement
policy, somethingwhich the authors phrase as a strat-
egy of “meta-control”. The paper asks which safe-
guards the authority has set in place while coordinat-
ing its own activities with private food safety con-
trols, what the advantages and risks involved in this
strategy are, and towhat extent this policy can be im-
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proved. From this Verbruggen and Havinga draw
broader lessons for public agencies elsewhere will-
ing to engage with private compliance mechanisms
in the domain of food safety and beyond.
Finally, the article by Peter Oosterveer discusses
the development of market-based standards for sus-
tainable seafood governance and traces the interplay
of these standards with public regulatory frame-
works in their negotiation, drafting, implementation
and enforcement. As Oosterveer contends, that inter-
playmay lead to competition, collaboration and even
hybridity across different stages in the regulatory cy-
cle.However, in analyzing a rangeof sustainable food
standards schemes, he finds that the bulk of the col-
laboration occurs in the negotiation and setting of
these schemes. As regards the implementation phase
Oosterveer observes both complementarity and com-
petition, while interaction is much less prevalent in
later phases of monitoring and enforcement, where
separation prevails. Due to this diversification in the
interplay between public and private standards in
this arena, Oosterveer’s outlook is that it is unlikely
that harmonization between public and private sus-
tainable seafood governance arrangements will hap-
pen in the near future.
IV. Patterns of Interplay
The contributions in this Special Issue illustrate the
fragmentation that dominates the field of food gov-
ernance with multiple actors operating in multiple
venues in both the domestic and the global arena.
We observe public actors that facilitate or built on
private food standards (Oldfield, Oosterveer), public
actors who seek to engage private auditing schemes
to delegate the inspection of compliance with public
standards (Van der Voort) and public agencies en-
rolling private actors trying to develop collaborative
control arrangements (Verbruggen and Havinga).
Such cooptation might lead to an increased regu-
latory capacity of public actors, in particular food
safety agencies. That capacity is under increasing
pressure due to themismatch between global supply
chains and regulatory powers that are confined to na-
tional territories, and due to consecutive rounds of
cutbacks on public expenditure, thus limiting the
control capacity of the state. What is more, the legal
powers of (international) public actors may not ex-
tend to issues that have become increasingly impor-
tant to consumers, such as sustainability in food
sourcing and production. By engaging with private
actors that do address those matters and facilitating
their activities, as Oosterveer shows, public actors
may still exert (soft) influence on the development
of food governance arrangements in that arena. Old-
field highlights that the policy alternatives consid-
ered by the US legislator had been developed and
tested by private food standards and voluntary pro-
grams audited by state inspectors. Finally, the public
food safety authority in the Netherlands sought to
strengthen its inspection capacity by employing pri-
vate audit results aspartof its risk-basedenforcement
policy (Van der Voort, Verbruggen and Havinga).
Conversely, public recognition of private arrange-
ments might add to the regulatory capacity of pri-
vate actors, more specifically the legitimacy of their
schemes. Alignment with existing private arrange-
ments by governments might enhance acceptance
among market actors and other private stakeholders
(Oosterveer, Oldfield). In other cases, however, gov-
ernmental policy may face legitimacy concerns be-
cause of a potential risk of capture (Verbruggen and
Havinga). In particular, the case study presented by
Van der Voort shows that developing and maintain-
ing a collaborative governance arrangement is a del-
icate job that requires sound judgement in balancing
the different interests of all participants, together
with the protection of the public interests involved.
The papers reveal two other issues that affect the
interplay between public and private actors, and it’s
course of events, namely the economic interests of
the actors involved and their yearning to retain a de-
gree of authority over the governance arrangement
and in particular over the own responsibilities and
obligations therein. Not surprisingly, economic inter-
ests are an important motivation for the actors to en-
gage with each other. Owners of private standards
and schemes are keen to increase theirmarket shares
and achieve efficiencies for clients and participating
foodbusiness (VanderVoort,VerbruggenandHavin-
ga). Accordingly, they support governance arrange-
ments that benefit their economic interests and are
reluctant to amend their standards and schemes that
do not align their interests. Efficiency concerns are
also important drivers for public actors, but perhaps
less dominant than for industry actors. Governments
may collaborate with private parties in order to im-
proveaccessofdomestic foodproducts to exportmar-
kets, as in the case of sustainable fish (Oosterveer),
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or to save public spending by way of transferring the
costs of audit and control to the industry (Van der
Voort, Verbruggen and Havinga). A more dominant
driver for collaboration among public actors, howev-
er, appears to be the goal to enhance regulatory ca-
pacity, or minimise the loss of such capacity in the
face of global supply chains and budgetary con-
straints (Oldfield, Van der Voort, Verbruggen and
Havinga).
In addition to economic interest, the case studies
presented in the articles also draw attention to the
desire of the actors to retain a degree of authority over
the responsibilities they assume under the arrange-
ment. Public actors certainly want to feel in control
over essential elements of the governance arrange-
ment (Oldfield, Van der Voort, Verbruggen and
Havinga) and determine the conditions for collabo-
ration. If private actors do not align, they are inclined
to pull the plug on a co-regulatory arrangement. Pri-
vate actors, for their part,mount resistance if the con-
ditions interfere with their way of doing business, as
Oldfield shows in her analysis of the opposition from
small farm and sustainable agriculture that nearly
blocked the discussed legislative reform in the US.
Van der Voort attributes the failure of the co-regula-
tory arrangement for the control of the quality of
eggs in the Netherlands to the resentment from egg-
farmers and the private body responsible for the
arrangement vis-à-vis the public actors involved,
which were felt to dictate the details of the arrange-
ment and curb the economic interest of the sector
(the costs of the required additional audits).
Accordingly, a proper co-regulatory arrangement
constitutes a difficult balancing act of all interests in-
volved, also those potentially conflicting. What is
more, the arrangement is not a static unit, but in-
volves a dynamic process in which actors and inter-
ests enter and leave the scene. Managing and align-
ing those interests presupposes sound communica-
tion between the actors involved, which turns out to
be a real challenge in practice. The contributions to
this Special Issue offer the reader key insights in just
how public and private actors go about this joint un-
dertaking and the problems they face along the way.
